Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Reserve Currency? by Menzie Chinn & Jeffrey Frankel
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
WILL THE EURO EVENTUALLY SURPASS THE DOLLAR









The authors would like to thank for helpful comments Jaewoo Lee and Ted Truman and other participants
at the NBER conference in Newport, RI.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2005 by Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.  Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Reserve Currency?
Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel
NBER Working Paper No. 11510
July  2005
JEL No. F02, F31, F33
ABSTRACT
Might the dollar eventually follow the precedent of the pound and cede its status as leading
international reserve currency?   Unlike ten years ago, there now exists a credible competitor: the
euro.   This paper econometrically estimates determinants of the shares of major currencies in the
reserve holdings of the world’s central banks.   Significant factors include: size of the home  country,
inflation rate (or lagged depreciation trend), exchange rate variability, and size of the relevant home
financial center (as measured by the turnover in its foreign exchange market).  We have not found
that net international debt position is an important determinant.   Network  externality theories would
predict a tipping phenomenon.  Indeed we find that the relationship  between currency shares and
their determinants is nonlinear (which we try to capture with a  logistic function, or else with a
dummy “leader” variable for the largest country).  But changes  are felt only with a long lag (we
estimate a weight on the preceding year’s currency share around  .9).   The advent of the euro
interrupts the continuity of the historical data set.  So we estimate  parameters on pre-1999 data, and
then use them to forecast the EMU era.  The equation correctly predicts a (small) narrowing in the
gap between the dollar and euro over the period 1999-2004.  Whether the euro might in the future
rival or surpass the dollar as the world’s leading international reserve currency appears to depend on
two things: (1) do the United Kingdom and enough other EU members join euroland so that it
becomes larger than the US economy, and (2) does US macroeconomic policy eventually undermine
confidence in the value of the dollar, in the form of inflation and depreciation.   What we learn about
functional form and parameter values helps us forecast, contingent on these two developments, how
quickly the euro might rise to challenge the dollar.     Under two important scenarios ￿ the remaining
EU members, including the UK, join EMU by 2020 or else the recent depreciation trend of the dollar
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Might the dollar lose its status as unrivaled international reserve currency?   Could it 
be "going the way of sterling, the guilder, the ducat and the bezant." 
1  Some authors argued 
as much ten years ago.
2   The international use of the yen and mark had risen rapidly in the 
1970s and 1980s, reducing the share of the dollar.   (See Table A or Figure 7.)  Some in the 
early 1990s suggested that the yen or mark might eventually overtake the dollar as the lead 
international currency. 
 
By the turn of the millennium, that idea had come to sound far-fetched.   In the 
meantime, both Japan and Germany had undergone a decade of remarkably low economic 
growth, the yen had declined, and the mark had disappeared altogether.  Fears that the 
international currency status of the dollar was under challenge were premature, as should 
have been obvious at the time.   Indeed, the international role of the dollar, at least as 
measured by its share of central banks international reserves, had stopped declining in 1990 
and had begun to reverse in the early 1990s.  (Again, refer to Table A or the graph.)   
Meanwhile, dollarization was increasing in Latin America and elsewhere.    
These developments were overshadowed by exchange rate movements: the 
continuation of the dollar’s post-1985 trend of depreciation, which lasted until 1995.   
Perhaps people have trouble distinguishing the question whether a currency like the 
dollar is declining in international reserve currency status from the question whether its 
foreign exchange value is falling.  It seems that the question of whether the dollar might 
lose its privileged status as lead international currency comes up each time the dollar 
experiences a few years of depreciation (late 1970s, early 1990s).  The dollar underwent a 
new depreciation in 2002-04.   On the basis of this fact alone, one could have predicted 
that international economists might be once again called upon to try to answer questions 
                                                 
1 Kindleberger (1995, p.6) 
 
2 Others who “cried wolf,” besides Kindleberger, include Kunz (1995). The February 25, 1995, 
issue of The Economist included an article and leader arguing that "the dollar' s dominance is 
waning," at the expense of the DM in particular.   Or Ramon Moreno, “Will the Yen Replace the 
Dollar?,”  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, no. 96-30, Oct. 18, 1996. 
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regarding the international currency rankings.
 3   Indeed, as the rise of the dollar/euro 
exchange rate reached its third year in late 2004, the financial press began to report that 
central banks were on the verge of large-scale diversification out of dollars.
4   
 
This time may be different than the earlier scares in the late 1970s and early 
1990s.   The difference is that the euro now exists as a plausible rival.
5   Notwithstanding 
the bumps in the road of European monetary integration and the doubts of many American 
economists, EMU became a reality in 1999, and the euro appeared in physical form four 
years later.   The new currency passed the most fundamental tests: the transition was 
relatively smooth, 12 countries today use the euro (and only the euro), and the new currency 
has entered into international use as well.    
In the first few years of its life, the euro did not receive much respect.  This was 
largely related to its substantial weakness against the dollar.   Certainly anyone who had 
predicted that on January 1, 1999, there would be a worldwide shift out of dollar reserves 
into the new alternative, and that the increased demand for euros might cause a large 
appreciation, was initially disappointed.
6   But subsequently this depreciation was fully 
reversed, and then some, in the strong appreciation of 2002-04.   
 
  This paper will seek to ascertain the determinants of international reserve currency 
status, and to make some predictions as to whether the euro might under some conditions 
eventually overtake the dollar, and if so when. 
 
                                                 
3   “Sometime soon, newspaper stories will begin reporting that central banks in Asia and 
elsewhere are diversifying out of dollars into euros, and that the dollar is in danger of eventually 
losing its status as premier international currency.”  -- Frankel (2004). 
 
4 E.g., Economist 12/04/04, 2/26/05; FT 1/24/05, 3/8/05, 3/11/05, 3/19/05, 5/17/05, 5/19/05, 
5/21/05;  NYT 3/11/05; and many others. 
 
5  One of the present authors in the mid-1990s took what felt at the time like a minority position 
regarding the prospects for the dollar (e.g., in Frankel, 1995):  “It is unlikely that some other 
currency will supplant the dollar as the world’s premier currency...There is no plausible alternative 
for the number one position”  (Eichengreen and Frankel (1996, p.363). But those papers also 
acknowledged “the possibility of a single currency coming into use throughout Europe, which would 
indeed pose a challenge to the supremacy of the dollar if it was to happen...” (p. 366).  “And as the 
euro becomes more important as a vehicle currency, it is likely to gain use as an intervention 
currency and to become an increasingly popular form in which other counties hold their reserves.  
Ultimately, the creation of the euro would mean a new and increasingly powerful rival for the dollar 
as the international monetary system’s leading reserve currency.” (p.372). 
 
6 “There will probably be a portfolio diversification of $500 billion to $1 trillion into euros.  Most 
of this shift will come out of the dollar.  This in turn will have a significant impact on exchange 
rates during a long transition period.  The euro will move higher than will be comfortable for 
many Europeans…The euro will probably be strong from its inception.” -- Bergsten (1997, p. 84-
85).   Portes and Rey (1998), also writing at a time of dollar strength, suggested that American 
policymakers had been overly pessimistic about the euro’s prospects.   These authors were 
exceptional in their counter-cyclical faith in the euro. 
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Table A 
Share of National Currencies in Total Identified              
Official Holdings of Foreign Exchange, End of Year (in percent) 
                 
  1965  1973  1977  1982  1987  1992  1997  2003 
All countries                 
 U.S. dollar  56.1  64.5  79.2  57.9  53.9  48.9  59.1  63.8 
 Japanese yen  0.0  0.1  2.2  4.1  6.8  7.4  5.1  4.8 
 Pound sterling  20.0  4.2  1.6  1.8  1.9  2.6  3.3  4.4 
 Swiss franc  0.0  1.1  1.9  2.3  1.7  0.8  0.5  0.4 
 Euro  0.0  0.0  0.0  --  --  --  --  19.7 
 Deutsche mark  0.1  5.5  9.3  11.6  13.8  14  13.7  -- 
 French franc  0.9  0.7  1.1  1  0.9  2.6  1.5  -- 
 Netherlands guilder  0.0  0.5  0.7  1  1.2  0.7  0.5  -- 
 ECUs  0.0  0.0  0.0  13.8  13.6  9.7  5  -- 
 Unspecified currencies  22.9  23.6  4.1  6.5  6.4  13.3  11.3  6.8 
 
Notes: Shares of total currency holdings by central banks. Source: IMF data--updated version of statistics 
contained in the IMF Annual Report.  1997 and 2002 figures from 2004 Annual Report. 
 
 
1. International Currency Rankings 
 
  First some definitions.   An international currency is one that is used outside its 
home country.   Reserve currency status is the main subject of this paper, but it is just one of 
a number of possible measures of international use.   The others can be neatly summarized 
by means of a simple 2x3 table originally introduced by Peter Kenen. (See Table B.)  The 
classic three functions of money domestically -- store of value, medium of exchange and 
unit of account – can be transferred to the level of international money.   Under each 
function, there are important examples of how government authorities and private actors 
sometimes choose to use a major international currency that is not their own.  The subject of 
this paper appears in the first cell, the decision of central banks to hold their reserves in the 
form of particular currencies.   But other possible criteria of an international currency also 
appear in the table: currency substitution (e.g., the circulation of dollar currency in Latin 
America  and  elsewhere),  denominating  or  invoicing  foreign  trade,  denominating  or 
invoicing international financial flows, pegs for smaller countries'  currencies, and foreign 
exchange trading.  
  We focus on reserve currency holdings for two reasons.   First,  annual data for all 
relevant currencies are available over the last 30 years or more;   the other international roles 
that appear in Table B are nowhere near as comprehensively quantifiable.  A second reason 
for focusing on the reserve currency role is that it is more relevant than the others to the 
important questions of whether the United States will continue to be able to finance its 
current account deficit. 
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Table B: Roles of an International Currency 
Function of money:  Governments  Private actors 
 
Store of value  International reserves  Currency substitution 
(private dollarization) 
Medium of exchange  Vehicle currency for foreign 
exchange intervention 
Invoicing trade and  
financial transactions 
Unit of account  Anchor  for  pegging  local 
currency 




Should we care about international currency rankings? 
  Is this question important? International currency status might seem to have fewer 
direct implications for the real economy than does the currency’s exchange rate.  But it is 
important nevertheless.  To begin with, the exchange rate question and the international 
currency question have always been causally inter-related [notwithstanding some periods 
such as the early 1990s when they have moved in opposite directions].  But the topic has 
become newly urgent in light of the question whether the US current account deficit is 
sustainable.   How long can it continue?  The historical experiences of other countries with 
current account thresholds and reversals are not particularly relevant, in that the argument 
for sanguinity relies on the special role of the dollar in the world financial system.  This 
paper  was  written  for  a  conference  on  the  sustainability  of  the  G-7  current  account 
imbalances, following two years when the major source of financing of the deficit was 
purchases  of dollar  assets  by  foreign  central  banks,  especially  in  Asia.   Unless  foreign 
private investors resume willingness to accumulate ever-greater quantities of US assets, the 
sustainability of the US current account deficit depends on the willingness of foreign central 
banks to do so.  That, in turn, depends on two factors: (1) the desire of foreign central banks 
to  continue  intervening  in  foreign  exchange  markets  to  try  to  dampen  or  prevent  the 
appreciation of their currencies against the dollar, and (2) the willingness of central banks to 
continue to hold the lion’s share of their reserves in the form of dollars as opposed to some 
rival currency, i.e., the euro.  While the former question received a fair amount of attention 
in 2003-04,
7 the latter question did not until 2005.
8 
ADVANTAGES OF HAVING AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY 
     One can think of four advantages to a country of having its currency play a large role in 
the world. 
     (1)  Convenience  for  the  country' s  residents.      It  is  certainly  more  convenient  for  a 
country' s exporters, importers, borrowers and lenders to be able to deal in its own currency 
than foreign currencies.  The global use of the dollar, as with the global use of the English 
language, is a natural advantage that American businessmen tend to take for granted.   
                                                 
7 E.g., Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and  Garber (2003); Goldstein (2004). 
 
8 Perhaps the question whether the currency preferences of central banks will continue to assign a 
special role to the dollar is not as important as the analogous question for private investors.   But 
this is still a matter of the dollar’s place as premier international currency, of which the reserve 
holdings is the most easily quanitified aspect.     
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     (2) More business for the country' s banks and other financial institutions.  There need be 
no firm connection between the currency in which banking is conducted and the nationality 
of the banks (nor between the nationalities of the savers and borrowers and the nationality of 
the  intermediating  bank).    Nevertheless,  it  stands  to  reason  that  U.S.  banks  have  a 
comparative advantage at dealing in dollars, British banks at dealing in pounds, etc. 
     (3) Seignorage. This is perhaps the most important advantage of having other countries 
hold one' s currency.  They must give up real goods and services, or ownership of the real 
capital stock, in order to add to the currency balances that they use.  Seignorage is not 
necessarily large if defined narrowly, as the low-interest loan accruing to the US when 
foreign central banks hold their reserves as dollars.  But it is much more important if defined 
broadly as America’s “exorbitant privilege” of being able to borrow abroad large amounts in 
its own currency, especially while simultaneously earning much higher returns on FDI and 
other investments in other countries.   This was the basis of European resentment against the 
U.S. basic balance deficit in the 1960s, and against the dollar standard to the extent that the 
European need to acquire dollars was the fundamental origin of the deficit, as will be seen 
below.   The willingness of Asians and others to continue financing the US current account 
deficit in the future is certainly related to the dollar’s continued role as premier international 
reserve currency.   We are not necessarily talking about seignorage narrowly defined 
(foreign holdings of US currency, which doesn’t pay interest).  More important is the US 
ability to run up huge debts denominated in its own currency at low interest rates.  The 
US has consistently earned more on it investments overseas than it has had to pay on its 
debts, a differential of about 1.2 per cent per annum (e.g., Cline, p. 45),   Possibly this 
American role of the world' s banker (taking short-term liquid deposits, and lending long 
term in riskier higher-return assets) would survive the loss of the dollar as leading 
international currency.   But it seems possible that the loss of one would lead to the loss 
of the other. 
 
      (4)  Political  power  and  prestige.    Britain' s  gradual  loss  of  key  currency  status  was 
simultaneous with its gradual loss of political and military pre-eminence.  As with most of 
the other benefits and conditions mentioned above, causality here flows in both directions.   
We shall come back to this issue in Section 3. 
 
DISADVANTAGES OF HAVING AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY 
 
    One can think of two disadvantages from the viewpoint of a key-currency country.  They 
explain why Japan and Germany were in the past reluctant to have their currencies held and 
used widely, and why China worries about the implications of beginning to internationalize 
its currency. 
    (1) Larger fluctuations in demand for the currency.  It is not automatically clear that 
having one' s currency held by a wide variety of people around the world will result in 
greater variability of demand.  Such instability is probably more likely to follow from an 
increase  in  the  degree  of  capital  mobility,  than  from  key  currency  status  per  se.  
Nevertheless,  the  two  are  related.    Central  banks  are  sometimes  concerned  that 
internationalization will make it more difficult to control the money stock.  This problem 
need not arise if they do not intervene in the foreign exchange market.  But the central bank 
may view letting fluctuations in demand for the currency be reflected in the exchange rate as 
being just as undesirable as letting them be reflected in the money supply.      
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     (2)  An  increase  in  the  average  demand  for  the  currency.    This  is  the  other  side  of 
seignorage.    In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the  Japanese  and  German  governments  were 
particularly  worried  about  the  possibility  that  if  assets  were  made  available  to  foreign 
residents, an inflow of capital would cause the currency to appreciate and render exporters 
less competitive on world markets.  Again, this is also China’s problem today. 
     (3)  Burden of responsibility.   The monetary authorities in the country of the leading 
international currency may have to take into account the effects of their actions on world 
markets, rather than being free to devote monetary policy solely to domestic objectives.   
The Federal Reserve probably cut interest rates more than it otherwise would have in the 
second half of 1982, and again in late 1998, in response to international debt problems in 
Latin America and elsewhere.   At times Argentina or others have considered officially 
dollarizing;  reluctance to accept any burden of responsibility, even if only implicit, explains 
the lack of enthusiasm from US authorities.
9 
 
2. The Approach of the Paper 
 
  The paper seeks econometrically to ascertain the determinants of international 
reserve currency shares over the period 1973-98, before the advent of the euro.   The 
exercise is largely parameter estimation and calibration, without a lot of hypothesis-
testing.  In other words we need to squeeze a lot out of a small sample and so we 
intentionally impose a lot of a priori information.  
 
  The literature on what determines reserve currency status is fairly well-established, if 
often lacking in quantification.    Three key points.   
(1)  Determinants.    There  is  a  list  of  determining  factors,  which  appears  in  subsequent 
section 5 below.  The most important is the size of the country or region in which the 
currency is indigenously used, but there are others as well.   
(2) Network externalities or economies of scale and scope are important.   Each country is 
more likely to use whatever currency is used by others.  Thus international currency use is 
not  linear  in  the  determinants.    Rather,  there  may  be  a  tipping  phenomenon
10:  if  one 
currency were to draw even and surpass another, the derivative of reserve currency use with 
respect to its determining variables would be higher in that range than in the vicinity of zero 
or in the range when the leading currency is unchallenged.   In that sense the switch happens 
rapidly. 
11  
(3) In the chronological sense, however, the switch happens slowly.   Whatever currency has 
been used in the past will continue to be used in the future.   Thus inertia is great. 
 
  We thus have three tasks: (1) ascertain the most important determinants and their 
relative weights, (2) confirm that the function is non-linear and settle on an appropriate 
functional form, and (3) estimate the extent of inertia, which we will represent by means of a 
lagged endogenous variable.  Our data come from reserve currency holdings of central 
                                                 
9  Thanks to Ted Truman for reminding us of this point. 
10  Tipping arises in many contexts.  Schelling (1978) and Gladwell (2000). 
11   As Eichengreen (2005) points out, counteracting the arguments about network externalities 
and tipping, particularly in determining the reserve currency function, is an argument in favor or 
multiple simultaneous international currencies: competition for the affections of investors.      
  8 
banks over the period 1973-1998.  One cannot be confident that any given data set will 
contain enough information to answer the questions of interest.  Unfortunately the available 
data do not extend anywhere near far back enough in history to observe the fall of the pound 
from its number one position of a century ago.  But the beginning of our data set does 
capture the mark passing the pound for the number two slot, which may be a useful data 
point for addressing the tipping phenomenon, item (2).   We hope that there is enough 
variation among the other currencies and across the other years to obtain useful estimates of 
parameters of interest under categories (1) and (3). 
  
  The disappearance of the mark, franc and guilder in 1999, and their replacement by 
the euro, constitute an irreparable break in the data series.  But we hope to turn this obstacle 
to advantage.   We obtain a check on the meaningfulness of the equation that was estimated 
on pre-1999 data by seeing whether it successfully predicts the direction of movement over 
the period 1999-2003.   Then we plan to use the equation to forecast the path of the currency 
shares of the dollar, euro, and other international currencies into the future, as a function of 
several different possible scenarios regarding, for example, whether the United Kingdom 
eventually joins EMU.   While we don’t expect to predict that the euro could overtake the 
dollar anytime soon, we enter this exercise with a completely open mind regarding whether 
the euro might overtake the dollar in the longer term. 
 
   
3. Brief History 
 
  There is of course an important historical precedent.
12  The pound sterling was the 
premier  international  currency  of  the  gold  standard  period.      Historians  estimate,  for 
example that 60 to 90 per cent of the world’s trade was invoiced in sterling in the 19
th 
century.
13    In 1899 the share of pound in known foreign exchange holdings of official 
institutions was more than twice the total of the next nearest competitors, the franc and the 
mark, and much greater than the dollar.
14   
 
WHEN THE DOLLAR OVERTOOK THE POUND 
 
  The US economy in the late 19
th century surpassed the British economy in 
size (1872
15).   US exports did not pull ahead of UK exports until World War I, and did not 
do so on a permanent and substantial basis until World War II.  (See  Figure 1.)  The 
development of the financial system lagged behind;  one reflection is that the United States 
                                                 
12    Alogoskoufis and Portes (1992) noted early on the precedent for the possible dethroning of 
the dollar. 
 
13   Broz (1997); Hale (1999). 
 
14   $105.1 million in pounds, $27.2m in francs, $24.2m in marks, and $9.4 in other currencies.   
In 1913, the ranking was the same: $425.4 million in pounds, $275.1m in francs, $136.9m in 
marks, and $55.3 in other currencies.  Lindert (1969, p.16-22). 
 
15 In real terms --1990 International Gheary-Kamis dollars.  
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did not establish a central bank until 1913.  During the years following 1914, the US passed 
from net debtor to net creditor while the UK moved in the opposite direction.  This had 
much to do with British borrowing from the United States so as to fight World War I.   The 
dollar was the only currency to remain convertible into gold at a fixed price into the 1920s.
16   
As it emerged as a major international currency, its use in international trade and finance 
widened increasingly.  The pound retained its dominant position as key currency in the 
interwar period, in large part due to the inertia in such arrangements that was noted above.  
As late as 1940, the level of foreign-owned liquid sterling assets was still double the level of 
foreign-owned liquid dollar assets.  By 1945, however, the position of the dollar and pound, 
as measured by this statistic, had precisely reversed.
17  World War II – including further US 




Figure 1 - US and UK exports 1900-1957 
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Data Sources  
UK Export Data: Department of Trade and Industry, UK; UK exchange rate (1946-1970): Global Financial Data; 
US Export Data: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times To 1970; Published by U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 
  The decline in the pound was clearly part of a larger pattern whereby the United 
Kingdom lost its economic pre-eminence, colonies, military power, and other trappings of 
international hegemony.   As some of us wonder whether the United States might now have 
embarked on a path of “imperial over-reach,” following the British Empire down a road of 
widening federal budget deficits and overly ambitious military adventures in the Muslim 
world,  the  fate  of  the  pound is  perhaps  a  useful  caution.     The Suez  crisis  of  1956  is 
frequently  recalled  as  the  occasion  on  which  Britain  was  forced  under  US  pressure  to 
                                                 
 
16 E.g., Nurkse (1944), Bergsten ( 1975, p.53), and Eichengreen (1992). 
17 Aliber (1966, p.19-20).  
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abandon its remaining imperial designs; the important role played by a simultaneous run on 
the  pound  is  often  forgotten.
18    Paul  Kennedy  (1989)’s  suggestion  of  the  imperial 
overreach  hypothesis  and  its  application  to  US  hegemony  may  have  been  essentially 
correct  but  ten  years  premature,  much  like  those  in  the  early  1990s  who  warned 
prematurely over the dollar’s imminent demise. 
 
 
THE DOLLAR IN THE BRETTON WOODS ERA 
 
  Though gold was the official international reserve asset of the monetary system that 
was established in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, the dollar was the true reserve 
asset of the postwar system.  During the initial period of "dollar shortage," the European and 
other currencies were not convertible into gold, and so were not prized as the dollar was 
(Kindleberger, 1950).  The Europeans and others measured their economic recovery from 
the  wartime  destruction  by  their  progressively  greater  ability  to  earn  dollars  through 
improving  trade  balances.    By  1958  the  balance  of  payments  of  the  major  European 
countries had improved sufficiently that they were able to restore convertibility (McKinnon, 
1979, p.5). 
  No sooner had the system of fixed-rate convertible currencies come into operation, 
than it was threatened with gradual rot.  In 1958, the United States began to run large 
balance  of  payments  deficits.    Although  these  deficits  were  nothing  other  than  the 
counterpart  of  the  European  surpluses,  they  presaged  trouble,  as  Robert  Triffin  (1960) 
pointed out.  The world' s demand for international reserves increases gradually in proportion 
to international income and trade.  As the supply of gold was more or less fixed, the dollar 
would be increasingly used as a supplementary reserve asset by other countries'  central 
banks under the Bretton Woods regime.  But there was only one way that other countries 
could earn dollars: by running balance of payments surpluses with the United States.  This 
led directly to what came to be known as the Triffin dilemma.  Either the United States 
would  take  measures  to  limit  its  balance  of  payments  deficit,  or  it  would  allow  other 
countries to continue to accumulate claims against it.  In the former case, the world would 
be deprived of its necessary reserves.  In the latter case, the ratio of outstanding dollar 
liabilities to gold held in Fort Knox would rise without limit, provoking at some point a 
crisis  in  which  private  speculators  (and  Charles  de  Gaulle)  would  lose  confidence  and 
present the American authorities with more claims for payment than could be met.
19 
  In the 1960s, the U.S. government adopted the stop-gap measure of putting controls 
on capital outflows.  Meanwhile economists debated three possible general solutions to the 
dilemma: raising the price of gold so as to increase the effective supply of reserves, creating 
a sort of "paper gold" as a new reserve asset, or moving to floating exchange rates so as to 
reduce countries'  demand for international reserves.
20   
                                                 
18 E.g., Boughton (2001) and “From Suez to Baghdad,” Charlemagne, The Economist, March 22, 
2003, p. 47. 
19  Kenen (1960) argued that central banks would be reluctant to hold reserves in the form of a 
currency like the dollar that was expected to lose value. 
20  McKinnon (1969) predicted, accurately as it turned out, that a move to floating rates, while it 
would reduce the official demand from central banks for the dollar as a key currency, would not  
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  But  the  day  of  reckoning  was  in  any  case  accelerated  substantially  by  the 
expansionary U.S. fiscal and monetary policies of the Viet Nam War era, and the resulting 
widening of the balance of payments deficit.  In August 1971 the United States unilaterally 
closed the official gold window, thereby ending the Bretton Woods era.  The attempt to 
patch up the fixed exchange rate system in the Smithsonian Agreement by devaluing the 
dollar against gold lasted only a short time.  By March 1973, all the major industrialized 
countries had given up the effort to keep their currencies pegged to the dollar.   
 
THE DOLLAR IN THE FLOATING-RATE ERA 
  One might have expected in the post-1973 period a sharp downward shift in the 
demand  for  reserves  by  the  major industrialized countries  that  moved to floating  rates.  
There  is  indeed  some  evidence  of  a  downward  shift.    But  the  demand  for  reserves 
nonetheless remained surprisingly high.
21  Even though the central banks are willing to 
tolerate a far higher degree of variability in their exchange rates than before 1973, it takes a 
much greater amount of intervention to achieve any given effect than in the period when 
international financial markets were less developed.  This may explain the still-high demand 
to hold reserves. 
  The fraction of reserves held specifically in the form of dollars began to decline in 
the late 1970s.  While it is important not to confuse a change in the use of a currency with a 
change in its exchange value against foreign currencies, the downward trend of the dollar 
was in fact partly a reflection of a decline in its value.  The depreciation of the dollar was 
concentrated particularly in three major episodes, one per decade: 1977-79, 1985-88, and 
1993-95.  (2002-04 looks to be the latest in the series.)   In each episode the dollar exchange 
rate became an issue of conflict between the United States and its trading partners, Europe in 
particular.  American Treasury Secretaries were periodically faulted for a policy of "benign 
neglect" of the dollar' s value.   
  Benign neglect was also the policy in the period of dollar appreciation from 1980 to 
February 1985.   A strong dollar has advantages for other countries -- improved prospects 
for their firms that export to the United States or that compete with imports -- as well as 
disadvantages -- an adverse shift in their terms of trade, higher prices for imported inputs 
like oil that (in the short run) have their prices set in dollars, upward pressure on wages.  A 
weak dollar has the corresponding disadvantages and advantages.  It is evident that the point 
of view in Europe that disparages both upswings and downswings must have as its objective 
a stable dollar.  Beyond the usual costs that are claimed from a volatile exchange rate, 
variability in the dollar as the world' s key currency was also blamed for: a ratcheting up of 
the level of protectionist barriers (as the United States erects import barriers when the dollar 
is strong, and trading partners do the same when it is weak), variability in the world price 
level (as countries intervene to stabilize the exchange rate and suffer consequent movements 
in their money supplies), and an inflationary bias (the result of the absence of a world 
nominal anchor to take the place of gold, the pound or the dollar). 
  The United States was accused, especially in the 1970s, of having neglected its 
social responsibility to supply the world with the "public good" of a stable international 
                                                                                                                                                 
reduce the private demand for an international currency.  He also predicted that the dollar would 
remain the currency best-suited to such a role.   
21 E.g., Heller and Khan (1978).  From similar evidence, Frenkel (1980, p.183) drew the observation 
that "economic behavior seems to be more stable than legal arrangements."  
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money.   Such complaints pointed up the conflict inherent in the dual role of the dollar as 
America' s currency and the world' s currency.  The charge also, in part, provided a rationale 
for the birth of the ECU in 1979 as a rival currency, which eventually in 1999 became the 
euro. 
   
4. International Use of the Euro So Far 
 
There are a variety of indicators of international currency use.  The sort that is 
available on the timeliest basis is the currency of denomination in cross-border financial 
transactions.  The euro soon after its debut came into wide use to denominate bonds.  
Within Europe there was a tremendous increase in issues of corporate bonds, 
denominated in euros, together with a rapid integration of money markets, government 
bond markets, equity markets, and banking.  While the frenetic activity seemed to be 
related to the debut of the euro, it does not meet the definition of “international currency 
use,” because it is taking place inside the currency’s home region.
22 
Outside Europe, the euro has been a success as well.
23   Detken and Hartmann 
(2000) studied the data from the euro’s first year in operation, doing a careful job of 
netting out intra-euro-area holdings in order to be able to trace back a measure of euro-
precursor currencies for five years before 1999 that is comparable with post-1999 
numbers.  They found more of an increase in the supply of euro-denominated assets 
outside of Europe than an increase in demand.
24      The stock of international debt 
denominated in euros increased from about 20 percent on the eve of EMU,  to 30 percent 
in 2003  (Rey, 2005,  p. 114).   
 
The last column of Table A reports the euro’s share in central banks’ foreign 
exchange reserves  – 19.7% in 2003.
25   Early estimates for 2002 equaled approximately 
                                                 
22 Gaspar and Hartmann (2005), and Rey (2005). 
23 Even based on just 1999 data, “…the euro has become the second most important currency in 
virtually all segments of international capital markets right from the start of stage 3” (Detkens and 
Hartmann, 2000).   Euro issues continued as strong ininto the first quarter of 2000 as in 1999, 
andnew decade: “…regular emerging market issuers now seem to regard the euro market as a 
genuine alternative to dollar markets” (Bishop, 2000). 
 
24 To be sure, unless these excess-supplied euros are piling up as dealer inventories, then 
arithmetically they must be matched by an increase in demand from European residents.  A 
depreciation of the euro does not automatically follow.  It depends which came first, the increase 
in supply of euro-denominated assets from non-residents or the increase in demand from 
residents.  Nevertheless the finding is suggestive.  At a minimum, it illustrates well the point that 
an increase in international use of a currency need not mean an increase in net demand for that 
currency or an appreciation. 
 
25 There have been substantial revisions in the estimated euro shares. For instance, in November 
2003 the IMF revised the 2002 estimate from 14.6% to 18.7 %. (IMF, 2003; ECB, 2003.); in the 
2004 Annual Report, the 2002 share is 19.3. The results reported here use the revised data, 
spliced together with the old data before 1980 [whereas results reported in the July 2004 pre-
conference used the pre-revised data.]. 
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the sum of the shares of the mark, French franc and guilder just before EMU, but is less 
than what one would get by adding in the share of ECUs.   This is to be expected:  before 
1999, the twelve central banks had to hold foreign exchange reserves, including of each 
others’ currencies; these disappeared at the stroke of a pen on January 1, 1999.    One 
cannot simply compare pre- and post-1999 figures to learn if the advent of the euro has 
hurt the attractiveness of the dollar as international reserve currency. 
 
International use of the euro has continued to grow during the first five years of 
its life.
26   About half of euroland trade with non-euro area residents is invoiced in the 
new currency.
27  The euro’s share in international debt securities has risen to above 30% 
(versus below 20% for the pre-1999 legacy currencies).  The comprehensive triennial 
survey of foreign exchange trading volume put together by the BIS showed the dollar still 
easily in first place in 2001, at 85% of all spot trades (out of 200%), followed by the euro 
at 43% and the yen at 26%.
28   The euro’s share of foreign exchange transactions in 2003 
reached one quarter (out of 100%) in Continuous Linked Settlement data.  The most 
recent triennial BIS survey, covering April 2004, showed the dollar still at 85% of all 
spot trades and euro at 44%.   Including also forwards and swaps, the dollar was involved 
in 89% of all transactions, and the euro in 37%.
29   
 
  In short, the euro is the number two international currency, ahead of the yen, and 
has  rapidly  gained  acceptance,  but  is  still  far  behind  the  dollar,  which  appears 
comfortably in the number one slot.  We now turn to a consideration of the determinants 
of international currency status.   
 
 
5. Factors that Suit a Currency for International Currency Status 
 
  The literature on international currencies has identified a number of determining 
variables.
30 
                                                 
26 The most recent annual report from the European Central Bank (2003), from which these 
statistics come, cites data through mid-2003. 
27 Hartmann (1998) predicted that the share of the euro in trade invoicing would gradually 
increase, though starting out a distant second place to the dollar globally. 
 
28 To compare foreign exchange trading volume in the euro with volume in its predecessor 
currencies, one must allow for the disappearance of intra-euro12 trading, as in the Detken and 
Hartmann’s (2002, p. 558-559) “simple arithmetic of EMU.”  They find that the observed decline 
is almost fully accounted for in this way. 
 
29  Bank for International Settlements (2005). 
 
30  Among the relevant references are Aliber (1966), Alogoskoufis and Portes (1992), Bergsten 
(1975), Black (1989), Eichengreen and Frankel (1996), Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000), Frankel 
(1992,  1995),  Kenen(1983),  Krugman  (1984),  Kindleberger  (1981),  Matsuyama,  Kiyotaki  and 
Matsui  (1993),McKinnon  (1969,  1979),  Portes  and  Rey  (1998),  Rey  (2001),  Swoboda  (1969), 
Tavlas (1993),  and Tavlas and Ozeki (1992).   
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(1)  Patterns  of  output  and  trade.  The  currency  of  a  country  that  has  a  large  share  in 
international output, trade and finance has a big natural advantage.  The U.S. economy is 
still the world' s largest in terms of output and trade.  By such measures, Japan should be 
number 2, ahead of Germany.  Alarmist fears of the early 1990s, notwithstanding, it was 
never very likely that Japan, a country with half the population and far less land area or 
natural resources, would surpass the United States in sheer economic size.   But the euro is 
now the home currency to 12 countries.  Their combined economic weight is much greater 
than Germany alone, or Japan.   It is not quite as large as the United States, as Table C 
shows.  But it may be in the future.  If the other three long-time EU members, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark, were to join today, euroland would equal the United 
States in economic size, as Table C shows.  If the 10 countries that acceded to the EU in 
May 2004 (most of them in Central Europe) were also to join EMU, the new monetary 
region would be larger than the US economy.  If any of these countries do join, it will be at 
least some years into the future.  Thus the question of relative size also depends on the 
growth rates of the US and European economies.  As an alternative to GDP, we could also 
look at countries’ trading volume as another indication of their relative weights in the world 
economy. 
 
Table C:   Size of US vs. Europe 
                             2003                      2004  
US    11.0 trillion 11.5 trillion
   
Euro-zone  
(12 countries) 
8.8 tr. 9.0 tr.
EU pre-5/1/04  
(15 countries)    
11.3 tr. 11.5 tr.
EU post-5/1/4 
(25 countries)    11.8 tr. 12.1 tr.
 
  For some measures of international currency use – how often a vehicle currency is 
used in the invoicing and financing of international trade -- other aspects of the pattern of 
trade may also be relevant.  The fact that much of Japan' s imports are oil and other raw 
materials and that much of its exports go to the Western Hemisphere, for example, helps 
explain why a disproportionately small share of trade is invoiced in yen as opposed to 
dollars.  Raw materials still tend heavily to be priced in dollars.   Whenever the dollar 
depreciates for more than a few years, OPEC starts discussing switching to another currency 
of denomination.  It hasn’t happened yet.   But it could, if the dollar’s primacy in other 
international roles were seriously challenged. 
   
  (2) The country' s financial markets.  To attain international currency status, capital 
and money markets in the home country must be not only open and free of controls, but also 
deep  and  well-developed.    The  large  financial  marketplaces  of  New  York  and  London 
clearly  benefit  the  dollar  and  pound  relative  to  the  euro  and  its  predecessor  the 
deutschemark,  as  Frankfurt  is  still  less  well-developed.    Tokyo  and  Frankfurt  financial 
markets have changed a lot over the last two decades.  But they still lag far behind New  
  15 
York  and  London  as  a financial  centers.   Meanwhile,  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong  have 
gained.   
  It has also been argued  that a strong central bank, and large financial sector to 
counterbalance the political influence of the trade sector, are important.  The point is to get 
support from “Wall Street,” to be able to resist political pressure from “Main Street” in favor 
of depreciating the currency to help sell goods.
31 
  It is surprisingly difficult to come up with a proxy for size, depth, or development 
that is available for all the financial centers.   We have opted to use as our primary measure 
data on foreign exchange turnover in the respective financial centers:  New York, London, 
Frankfurt, Tokyo, Zurich, etc.   This measure differs from turnover of the currencies (dollar, 
pound, euro, etc.), a variable that would be much more simultaneous with the international 
currency status that we are trying to explain.   It captures, for example, the pre-eminence of 
London, which continues despite the small role of the pound.  This measure has the virtue of 
reflecting to some extent all kinds of international financial transactions (both long-term and 
short-term, banking and securities, bonds and equities).   Moreover it is possible to patch 
together a data set covering the desired countries and years -- though but just barely, and 
with increasing difficulty as one goes back through the 1970s.  We have also tried an 
alternative proxy for the size of financial centers – the size of the countries’ stock markets. 
 
     (3) Confidence in the value of the currency.  Even if a key currency were used only as a 
unit of account, a necessary qualification would be that its value not fluctuate erratically.  As 
it is, a key currency is also used as a form in which to hold assets (firms hold working 
balances of the currencies in which they invoice, investors hold bonds issued internationally, 
and central banks hold currency reserves).  Here confidence that the value of the currency 
will be stable, and particularly that it will not be inflated away in the future, is critical.  The 
monetary authorities in Japan, Germany and Switzerland, in the 1970s established a better 
track  record  of  low  inflation  than  did  the  United  States,  which  helped  their  bids  for 
international currency status.   As recently as the 1980s, the mean and variance of the 
inflation  rate  in  the  United  States  were  both  higher  than  in  those  three  hard-currency 
countries,  though  lower  than  in  the  United  Kingdom,  France,  Italy,  and  many  other 
countries.
32  
  Given the good U.S. inflation performance in the 1990s, this is no longer such a 
concern as it was formerly.  A more important negative for the dollar is the fact that the 
United States is now a large-scale debtor country.
33  Even if the Federal Reserve never 
succumbs to the temptations or pressures to inflate away the U.S. debt, the continuing U.S. 
current account deficit is always a possible source of downward pressure on the dollar.  
Such fears work to make dollars unattractive.  
 
                                                 
31 For example, Hale (1995) and Frieden (2000).  
32 E.g., Tavlas and Ozeki (1991). 
 
33 The US statistics on both net international investment position and net investment income have 
shown “false alarms” in the past.  The numbers have repeatedly been revised to postpone the date at 
which, first the stock position, and then the income balance, turn negative.   But there is no doubt that 
the US has large since become the world’s largest net debtor.  
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(4) Network externalities 
  An international money, like domestic money, derives its value because others are 
using  it.    It  is  a  classic  instance  of  network  externalities.    In  this  sense,  the  intrinsic 
characteristics  of  a  currency  are  of  less  importance  than  the  path-dependent  historical 
equilibrium.  There is a strong inertial bias in favor of using whatever currency has been the 
international currency in the past.   
  One can make an analogy with language.    If one sat down to design an ideal 
language, it would not be English.  (Presumably it would be Esperanto.)   Nobody would 
claim that the English language is particularly well-suited to be the world' s lingua franca by 
virtue of its intrinsic beauty, simplicity, or utility. It is neither as elegant and euphonious as 
French, for example, nor as simple and logical in spelling and grammar as Spanish or 
Italian.  Yet it is certainly the language in which citizens of different countries most often 
converse and do business, and increasingly so.  One chooses to use a lingua franca, as one 
chooses a currency, in the belief that it is the one that others are most likely to use.  
  Krugman  (1984)  showed  how  there  can  be  multiple  equilibria  in  use  of  an 
international  currency,  developing  some  informal  ideas  of  earlier  authors  such  as 
Kindleberger (1981), McKinnon (1979), and Swoboda (1969).  Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and 
Matsui (1993) went to the next level of abstraction analyzing this problem with the theory of 
random matching games.   See also Rey (2001). 
  The  implication  is  that  small  changes  in  the  determinants  will  not  produce 
corresponding changes in the reserve currency numbers, at least not in the short run.  At a 
minimum, changes will show up only with a long lag.  As noted, the pound remained an 
important  international  currency  even  after  the  United  Kingdom  lost  its  position  as  an 
economic superpower early in the century.  In the present context, the inertial bias favors the 
continued central role of the dollar.  Also, as already noted, economies of scale suggest that, 
even  in  the  long  run,  measures  of  international  currency  use  may  not  be  linear  in  the 
determinants.   There may be a tipping phenomenon when one currency passes another. 
 
  Another aspect of the network externalities is economies of scope. An individual 
(exporter,  importer,  borrower,  lender,  or  currency  trader)  is  more  likely  to  use  a given 
currency in his or her transactions if everyone else is doing so.  If a currency is widely used 
to invoice trade, it is more likely to be used to invoice financial transactions as well.  If it is 
more widely used in financial transactions, it is more likely to be a vehicle currency in 
foreign exchange trading.   If it is used as a vehicle currency, it is more likely to used as a 
currency to which smaller countries peg.   And so forth.   In this paper we content ourselves 
with trying to predict reserve currency holdings.   But this will depend on some of the other 
measures of international currency use.
34  
                                                 
34  In some of our regression tests we tried adding to our list of determinants a measure of the 
popularity of the major currencies for smaller currencies to peg to [as suggested by Eichengreen 
and Mathieson].     An Asian country that is pegged to the dollar, for example, is likely to hold a 
larger share of its reserves in the form of the dollar.   We recognize that the pegging decision may 
be endogenous, determined simultaneously with the reserve holding decision and the various 
other measures of international currency use.    We did not find a significant positive effect.  
Perhaps this is just as well, in saves us the trouble of trying to deal with the endogeneity of the 
pegging decision. [One possibility would be to use an instrumental variable for pegging choices,  
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6. Estimation  
 
  We use the IMF annual data on aggregate central bank holdings of the relevant 
major currencies.  The data are not generally available according to holding of individual 
central banks, because most of them regard this as highly confidential.
35 
 
The data are illustrated in scatter plots:  the currency shares against GDP at 
market rates, or GDP in PPP terms, in Figures 1-2, respectively.  (Subsequent plots show 
the share against the inflation differential, exchange rate volatility, turnover, and 
proportion of pegged exchange rates, in Figures 3-6, respectively).  They suggest two 
preliminary propositions.  First, it does not seem that the difference between GDP 
measured at market rates or in PPP terms is essential for our purposes.   Second it is 
apparent from Figures 1 and 2 that the relationship between currency shares and GDP 
shares is nonlinear.   The data points representing the non-dollar currencies seem to 
suggest a rather flat dependence on size; but the existence of the data points representing 
the dollar indicates that the curve must turn sharply upward somewhere in the middle. 
 
Functional Form 
Indeed, the functional form cannot literally be linear, because the currency shares are 
bounded between 0 and 1, and not all the right hand side variables are similarly constrained. 
One common way of taking into account such a constraint is to use a logistic transformation 
of the shares variable.
36  The standard logistic transformation is symmetric, and has a 
maximal slope at share equal 0.50.   Figures 1a and 2a plot the logistic of the currency 
share against the size variables.  The straight line now seems to fit the data much more 
comfortably, indicating that the logistic may be a good guess. 
 
Basic estimation results, 1973-1998 
 
A simple linear relationship is useful as a starting point, even though it cannot 
literally be correct.  Table 1 reports results of regressions of currency shares against the 
variables we have discussed.
37  In all instances a lagged endogenous variable is included, 
to account for partial adjustment, which seems to be an important factor empirically. 
                                                                                                                                                 
such as past colonial status.]   In what follows we emphasize regressions without the pegging-
anchor variable included.    
35  The IMF data is broken down into aggregate holdings by industrialized countries and 
aggregate holdings by developing countries.     Some have suggested that the first data set is more 
interesting because the reliability of the statistics is higher.   Others have suggested that the 
second data set is more interesting because the G10 countries cannot hold their own currencies as 
reserves.  Whatever the motive, it would be worth repeating our econometrics on the holdings 
broken bifurcated in this way, and we hope to do so in the future. 
 
36  Logistic = log(share/(1-share)). 
 
37 Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) panel estimation yields qualitatively similar results. 
There is an obvious reason to expect a correlation of the error term across currencies:  since the 
shares must sum to one, upward disturbances in one currency should be associated with negative  
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Column [1] reports the outcome of a simple regression specification. The results 
indicate that income share enters positively and significantly, while inflation (expressed 
as the differential vis-à-vis average industrial country inflation) enters negatively, as does 
exchange rate volatility. When forex turnover is included, in the specification of column 
[2], the inflation and volatility effects are significant and in the directions anticipated. 
Augmenting the specification to include an indicator variable for the leader country 
(columns [3] and [4]) yields a statistically significant and positive coefficient estimate;   
but since the US is the leader during the entire sample period, this variable reduces to a 
fixed effect for the US. 
 
Next, the results in columns [5] and [6] report specifications where the inflation 
variable is replaced by a long depreciation trend, estimated as 20-year average rate of 
change of the value of the currency against the SDR. In neither case is this variable 
statistically significant, and indeed, very few variables appear significant in these cases.  
 
One point of interest is that the coefficients on the lagged endogenous variable 
suggest a very slow adjustment rate. Only about 4% to 10% of the adjustment to the long 
run is estimated to occur in a single year.   The half-life is on the order of 17 years for this 
slower rate of adjustment. 
 
Now consider the logistic transformation, which reflects the inherent nonlinearity 
of the problem. Immediately it is clear that, judged by the number of statistically 
significant coefficients, this is a more successful functional form. Columns [1]-[7] in 
Table 2 are analogous to those in Table 1. Most of the qualitative results are unchanged. 
The adjustment rate is now somewhat more rapid, about 12% per year.  
 
Columns [5] and [6] report the logistic specification substituting a 20 year 
depreciation trend for the inflation differential. The estimates are not significant save for 
income and the lagged endogenous variable. A little investigation reveals that the results 
are particularly sensitive to the inclusion of the Japanese yen (which had a strong trend 
appreciation over the sample period, without ever attaining as big an international role as 
predicted by many). Excluding data for Japan yields the results in column [7], which 
indicates a significant role for long depreciation. 
 
  Some readers, correctly noting that our regressions use value shares of reserves, 
point out two implications.   One is that the current exchange rate appears, as the 
valuation term, on the left-hand  side of the equationk, and in some cases appears on the 
right-hand side as well.   The second is that changes in our dependent variable do not 
necessarily represent “currency diversification,” in the sense of central banks physically 
selling some currencies and buying others.    Our reply is that portfolio theory clearly 
says that shares should be valued at current exchange rates.   That the exchange rate 
                                                                                                                                                 
disturbances on average across the others. (“Other currencies” and ecus are not included in the 
regressions, so the correlation is not perfect.)  Since the results do not differ very much, we report 
the simple panel estimates. 
  
  19 
sometimes enters calculations of variables on the right-hand side at the same time as the 
left does not in itself necessarily mean that we have an econometric problem of 
endogeneity or simultaneity.   For one thing, if the specification is correct, having the 
exchange rate on both sides need not imply simultaneity bias.   For another thing, the 
contemporaneous exchange rate does not always appear directly on our right-had side.  
Some equations include the long run trend depreciation, where the contemporaneous 
exchange rate does represent the end point, but others do not.  Also, while results 
reported here measure countries’ relative GDPs at current exchange rates, we have also 
tried measuring PPP at rates.   It does not seem to make much difference.   That said, it 
might be interesting in future research to try regressions with reserve holdings measured 
just as quantities (it would probably have to be changes), to see if central banks are 
diversifying in this narrow sense. 
 
Post sample test, 1999-2004 
 
  We chose one specification to evaluate the reliability of the models out of sample. 
The post sample period is quite short, comprising only 5 years worth of data. Hence, we 
cannot undertake formal out-of-sample tests for parameter stability.  Furthermore, given the 
disappearance  of  the  mark,  franc,  and  other  European  currencies,  we  cannot  make  a 
prediction as to the currency shares of the euro and its rivals for the date of its debut.  Given 
these constraints, we adopt a limited test. We conduct an ex post static simulation of the 
data, to see if our parameter estimates can predict correctly the direction of movement of the 
currency shares looking forward from 1999. We use the coefficient estimates reported in 
column [2] of table [2], which has statistically significant and correctly signed coefficients in 
all cases save the forex turnover variable.  
 
  The results are presented in Figures 9 and 10.  They indicate that the models fit quite 
well.   A good deal of work is being done by the lagged endogenous variable.  But the 
important  and  reassuring  point  is  that  our  equation  correctly  predicts  the  direction  of 
movement after 1999 of the currency share: downward, for the dollar and yen, and upward 
for the euro and pound. 
 
  We also checked the out-of-sample predictions produced from the specification in 
column [5], which used long-term trend depreciation rates as the rate of return variable, in 
place of inflation rates. The results for the currency shares are similar to those presented in 
these graphs. 
 
Sensitivity  tests 
 
  There is substantial latitude for deciding upon the best variables to include in the 
empirical  specifications.  We  extended  the  investigation  to  include  alternative  variables. 
These results are reported in Appendix Table 1.   (We are not calling these robustness 
checks, because we do not have the luxury of sufficient data to expect robust results, or even 
to dispense with a priori judgments in our basic specification.) 
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  First, we tried a different measure of economic size, trade, in place of GDP.  The 
results of replacing the relative income variable with a relative exports variable are reported 
in column [1]. While the coefficient on exports exhibits approximately the same level of 
statistical significance, the other variables do not.   GDP is a more standard criterion for size 
in the literature on international currencies, so we see no reason to prefer the alternative 
scaling variable. 
 
  Another question pertains to network externalities or economies of scope.   Does 
reserve currency use depend upon another instance of international currency status -- how 
many currencies are pegged to that key currency?   Smaller countries are more likely to hold 
their reserves in a given major currency if they are pegged to that currency.  We added a 
variable defined as the share of the world’s currencies pegged to a particular base currency, 
as a proportion of all pegged currencies.
38  (At the same time, we omitted our forex turnover 
variable.)  This  new  variable,  capturing  the  “peg  anchor”  role,  was  not  statistically 
significant.    Surprisingly it actually showed a negative sign, probably because the French 
franc ranks so high by this criterion, and yet is not an important reserve currency.   
 
  We also wished to investigate the thesis that the use of a reserve currency could be 
negatively affected by a country’s net debtor position.  We did not have good data for these 
countries’ net foreign asset position that was available for the entire sample.  We used the 
cumulative current account balances reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti. These results 
indicate  a  statistically  insignificant  relationship  between  net  foreign  assets  and  reserve 
currency use.  Again, the coefficient is of a surprisingly negative sign, probably because the 
dollar’s share continued strong in the 1990s even as the United States underwent its big 
swing from creditor to debtor. 
 
  As mentioned, one of the key determinants is the liquidity of a candidate’s financial 
center, which we measured by turnover in the foreign exchange market.  We investigated 
using alternative measures of financial market liquidity and depth. We considered three 
stock market measures:  capitalization and total value traded, both of them defined as a share 
of GDP, and also stock market turnover. In no case did these variables enter with statistical 
significance.  In two cases, value traded and turnover, they entered with the unexpected sign.  
We also considered a measure of the depth of countries’ bond markets, but found no support 
for its role as a determinant of a reserve currency’s use;  data availability limited us to the 
1990-98 period, an admittedly short sample.  
 
7. Extrapolation to the future 
 
  The goal of the project is to use the estimated parameters to forecast the shares of 
the  dollar,  euro,  and  other  currencies  in  the  coming  decades.      Under  any  plausible 
scenario, the dollar will remain far ahead of the euro and other potential challengers for 
many years.  But we want to know if there are plausible scenarios that give a different 
answer for 20 or 30 years into the future and, if so, what are the variables that are most 
important to this outcome.   First, two caveats – these are simulations incorporating fairly 
                                                 
38 Eichengreen and Mathieson  tried this peg anchor variable.  
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mechanical variations.   There are no interactions between, say, exchange rate depreciation 
and exchange rate volatility.  We do not even attempt to predict the future course of these 
variables.   Secondly, the simulations are of course only as good as the parameters that we 




  If none of the explanatory variables were to change in the future from its current 
values, then the long run shares of the currencies could be estimated with no further 
inputs.
39     This will almost certainly show the dollar retaining the lead even in the long 
run. We regard this scenario as quite possible, but not the only one. 
 
  A high-euro scenario would have many European countries joining EMU by the 
end of this decade.   Most eager to join are the ten countries that joined the EU in May 
2004 (8 of which are in Central Europe).  It is also possible that the three remaining long-
standing EU members, Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom might join.  All these 
countries together would make it likely that euroland exceeds the United States in income 
and trade.  In that case, it becomes a real possibility that the euro would gradually gain on 
the dollar, and eventually challenge it for the number one position.  The key question is 
whether the United Kingdom joins, not just because it is the largest of them, but also 
because it would bring with it the London financial markets.   As of mid-decade, it does 
not look very likely that Britain will join in the coming decade, and we are certainly not 
predicting that it will. 
 
  We  could  also  experiment  with  different  assumptions  regarding  the  other 
explanatory variables.  Real growth has been slower in Europe than in the United States 
for some years, largely due to lower population growth; if this trend were to continue, it 
would retard the trend.  US monetary policy has recently been looser than ECB monetary 
policy.  Is it possible that the Fed will eventually come under pressure to monetize the 
growing US national debt?  Or that the  exchange rate will become more volatile, in 
response  to  current  account  deficits  or  troubles  in  the  Mideast?    It  may  be  worth 
exploring a few different scenarios.  
 
Results of the Simulations 
 
  In order to focus on the dynamics between the two key reserve currencies, at this 
point  we  pare  down  the  analysis  to  the  dollar  and  the  euro.  We  use  a  two-currency 
specification informed by what we have learned from our seven-currency regressions.  In 
particular, we continue to transform the shares variable using the logistic function.  Focusing 
on a two currency specification is helpful as (1) it is difficult to model the other reserve 
currencies with shares less than 10%, and (2) it allows us to easily to impose up the adding 
constraint.     
 
                                                 
39 As the reciprocal of one minus the speed of adjustment, times the value fitted from the rest of 
the variables and parameter estimates.  
  22 
  The results are reported in Table 3, for specifications involving inflation differentials 
and depreciation.  Columns [1] and [3] report stripped down specifications involving only 
income and the inflation and depreciation variables.  Columns [2] and [4] report the more 
comprehensive  specifications  including  exchange  rate  variability  and  turnover.  In  these 
pared down specifications, income and exchange rate variability are the most significant 
variables, although income is not always statistically significant even when the coefficient is 
fairly large. The rise in standard errors in the two currency estimation suggests that variation 
across  currencies  contributed  substantial  power  to  the  seven-currency  results.    In  these 
specifications, depreciation shows up as borderline (20%) significant in column [4]. We use 
this specification in the simulations that follow. 
 
  We  consider  four  scenarios,  defined  by  alternative  assumptions  regarding  the 
relative size of the euro area and the United States. In case 1, the ten countries that joined the 
EU  in  2004  join  EMU  in  2010,  and  the  US  grows  slightly  relative  to  world  income, 
increasing its share by two percentage points over 30 years.  In case 2, the US only holds 
steady its proportion of world income, while the euro area  grows by the ten accession 
countries.
40 In case 3, the accession countries join in 2010, and Sweden and Denmark in 
2015. Finally, case 4 incorporates UK entry in 2020. 
 
  For  each  of  these  cases,  we  consider  four  possibilities  for  exchange  rate 
depreciation:  Scenario A involves the currencies depreciating (against the SDR) at the same 
trend  rate  that  they  did  over  the  1990-2004  period;  this  turns  out  to  be  virtually  zero 
depreciation.  Scenario B assumes the exchange rates stay at the end-2004 levels. Scenario 
C considers the possibility of the currencies continuing to depreciate at the 20-year trend 
rates realized at the end of 2004. Finally, Scenario D contemplates the persistence of the 
trends observed over the 2001-2004 period, when the dollar depreciated at a 3.6% rate per 
annum, and the euro appreciated at a 4.6% rate. 
 
  Table 4 summarizes the outcome of the simulations.  Some scenarios lead to erosion 
of the dollar’s position as the world’s premier international reserve currency.      Briefly put, 
if the UK joins EMU (Case 4), the euro becomes the dominant currency.  The only UK-in 
scenario in which it does not  is when 20-year trend depreciation is assumed to drop to zero, 
which requires an immediate jump in the dollar’s value in 2005.  If currency trends of the 
recent past persist (Scenario D), the euro not only gains dominance, but does so rapidly – by 
2019.  
 
  In  the  other  combinations,  the  dollar  retains  the  lead,  although  the  degree  of  
dominance  depends  upon  the  assumptions  underlying  the  scenario  and  rate  of  currency 
depreciation.  When the US dollar retains its lead, it typically does so by about 30 to 35 
percentage points.  When the euro gains the lead, the lead can range from 10 percentage 
points (the scenario with no entry of UK, Sweden or Denmark, strong US growth, and rapid 
dollar depreciation combined with euro appreciation) to 65 percentage points (UK entry and 
rapid dollar depreciation and euro appreciation).  
 
                                                 
40 We are being conservative as regards the new EU 10.     Current plans are for the euro area to 
be expanded to 15 members in 2006 and 18 in 2007.    
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  Figures 11-14 display the simulated dynamics of the USD and EUR holdings (here 
expressed as shares of the sum of USD and EUR reserve holdings). Figure 11 illustrates that 
when the euro area is composed of the current Euro-12 and the accession countries (as of 
2010),  and  the  exchange  rates  remain  at  their  end-2004  levels,  the  dollar  retains  its 
dominance.  Figure 12 represents the scenario where Sweden and Denmark join the euro 
area in 2015 as well, and the currencies continue to depreciate or appreciate at the 20 year 
trends that held at the end of 2004. The dollar also retains its dominance here, but by a very 
slightly smaller amount.  Euro dominance occurs (by 2023) if the currencies continue the 
trends  experienced  over  the  2001-04  period  (3.6%  depreciation  for  the  dollar,  4.6% 
appreciation for the euro, both on an annualized basis).  
 
  The euro gains overwhelming dominance in the instance where the UK joins the 
euro area and rapid depreciation persists indefinitely. In this combination, the switchover 
occurs in 2020 and eventually the euro accounts for more than 80% of combined USD and 
EUR holdings.  
 
Summary Conclusions 
  The major pay-off of the paper is predictions about scenarios under which the 
euro might in the future rival or surpass the dollar as the world’s leading international 
reserve currency.    That question appears to depend most importantly on two things: (1) 
whether enough other EU members join euroland so that it becomes larger than the US 
economy and, in particular, whether the UK comes in, with its large financial markets; 
and  (2)  whether  US  macroeconomic  policies  eventually  undermine  confidence  in  the 
value of the dollar through inflation and depreciation.   Whatever value this exercise has 
probably consists of estimating, contingent on those two things happening, how quickly 
the euro might rise to challenge the dollar.   We find that if all 13 EU members who are 
not  currently  in  EMU  join  it  by  2020,  including  the  United  Kingdom,  then  the  euro 
overtakes the dollar a few years later.   We also find that even if some of these countries 
do not join, a continuation of the recent trend depreciation of the dollar, were it to occur 
for whatever reason, could bring about the tipping point even sooner.     
  Euro enthusiasts suffered some setbacks in mid-2005.
41   But most assessments of 
the sustainability and adjustment of the US current account see a role for substantial 
depreciation of the dollar in the future, whether operating via expenditure-switching or a 
valuation effect.  Our results suggest that such dollar depreciation would be no free lunch, 






                                                 
41 A slowdown of some major economies, rejection of a new EU constitution in French and Dutch 
referenda, and a new depreciation of the euro.  
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Pre-euro (1973-98)           
Dependent variable: share            
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
GDPratio (y)  0.098  0.123  0.086  0.115  0.096  0.085 
  [0.044]  [0.049]  [0.044]  [0.049]  [0.046]  [0.047] 
Inflationdiff (￿)  -0.071  -0.107  -0.097  -0.143     
  [0.052]  [0.060]  [0.054]  [0.063]     
Depreciation ( ￿s)          -0.051  -0.094 
          [0.070]  [0.074] 
Exratevar (￿)  -0.028  -0.057  -0.020  -0.055  -0.033  -0.030 
  [0.020]  [0.032]  [0.020]  [0.032]  [0.029]  [0.030] 
Fxturnoverratio (to)    0.019    0.023  0.011  0.016 
    [0.016]    [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.017] 
GDPleader (leader)      0.023  0.026    0.023 
      [0.013]  [0.014]    [0.014] 
lagshare (sh t-1)  0.956  0.944  0.922  0.904  0.956  0.923 
  [0.017]  [0.020]  [0.026]  [.029]  [.018]  [.027] 
N  182  182  182  182  182  182 
sample  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98 
Adj R2  0.99  0.99  0.99   0.99   0.99   0.99  
 
Notes: Dependent variable is sh. Estimated using OLS, no constant. All variables are in decimal form.  
GDP at market terms. Figures in bold face are significant at the 10% level. 
  





Pre-euro (1973-98)             
Dependent variable: logit              
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
Constant  -0.506  -0.648  -0.497  -0.674  -0.488  -0.487  -0.117 
  [0.123]  [0.154]  0.124  [0.154]  [0.138]  [0.138]  [0.061] 
GDPratio (y)  2.285  2.768  2.735  3.690  2.215  2.775  1.040 
  [0.564]  [0.643]  [0.781]  [0.923]  [0.616]  [0.854]  [0.288] 
Inflationdiff (￿)  -1.565  -2.639  -1.512  -2.860       
  [0.927]  [1.156]  [0.930]  [1.164]       
Depreciation ( ￿s)          -1.079  -0.920  -1.095 
          [1.294]  [1.306]  [0.594] 
Exratevar (￿)  -0.445  -0.981  -0.594  -1.395  -0.583  -0.798  -1.251 
  [0.457]  [0.573]  [0.491]  [0.644]  [0.581]  [0.624]  [0.341] 
Fxturnoverratio (to)    0.446    0.576  0.208  0.252  0.427 
    [0.289]    [0.303]  [0.302]  [0.305]  [0.145] 
GDPleader (leader)      -0.125  -0.217    -0.150   
      [0.150]  [0.156]    0.159   
laglog(sh t-1/1- sh t-1)  0.879  0.851  0.882  0.846  0.881  0.882  0.957 
  [0.025]  [0.031]  [0.025]  [.031]  [.029]  [.029]  [.014] 
N  182  182  182  182  182  182  156 
sample  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98 
Adj R2  0.97  0.97  0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97   0.99  
 
Notes: Dependent variable log(sh/(1-sh)) Estimated using OLS.  All variables are in decimal form. GDP at 
market terms. Figures in bold face are significant at the 10% level. Column [7] omits Japanese yen, and 
estimated using cross-section weighted standard errors. 
 
  




Pre-euro (1973-98)       
Dependent variable: logit        
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
b 
Constant  -0.392  -0.465  -0.470  -0.532 
  [0.132]  [0.167]  [0.159]  [0.165] 
GDPratio (y)  0.762  1.015  0.904  0.974
 a/  
  [0.247]  [0.773]  [0.294]  [0.688] 
Inflationdiff (￿)  -0.554  -0.844     
  [1.247]  [1.259]     
Depreciation ( ￿s)      -3.497  -4.524 
a/ 
      [3.642]  [3.337] 
Exratevar (￿)    -2.375    -2.381 
    [1.213]    [1.121] 
Fxturnoverratio (to)    0.489    0.652
 a/  
    [0.487]    [0.454] 
laglog(sh t-1/1- sh t-1)  0.829  0.775  0.830  0.795 
  [0.043]  [0.085]  [0.043]  [.076] 
N  26  26  26  52 











Notes: Dependent variable log(sh/(1-sh)) Estimated using OLS.   
All variables are in decimal form. GDP at market terms.  
Figures in bold face are significant at the 10% level.  
a/ Significant at 20% msl. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Simulation Results 
 
 





Level of exchange 
rate stays at end-
2004 levels 
(Scenario B) 
Rate of long 
depreciation remains 
at 2004 rates 
(Scenario C) 
Rate of depreciation 
over 2001-04 period 
continues  
(Scenario D) 
UK, Swe., Den. stay 
out, US grows rel. 








EUR exceeds USD 
in 2024 
UK, Swe., Den. stay 








EUR exceeds USD 
in 2023 
UK, stays out of 







EUR exceeds USD 
in 2022 
UK joins EMU in 
2020 (Case 4) 
USD retains 
dominance 
EUR exceeds USD 
in 2022 
EUR exceeds USD 
in 2022 
EUR exceeds USD 
in 2019 
 
Notes: Summary of outcomes for combinations of Cases and Scenarios. 
Case 1: Accession countries join EMU in 2010, US share of world income rises by 2 percentage points over 
30 years. 
Case 2: Accession countries join EMU in 2010, US retains share of world income.  
Case 3: Accession countries join EMU in 2010, Sweden and Denmark joins in 2015, US retains share of 
world income. 
Case 4: Accession countries join EMU in 2010, Sweden and Denmark joins in 2015, UK joins in 2020, US 
retains share of world income. 
 
Scenario A: 20-year rate of depreciation stays at past rate (0%), requiring an appreciation after 2004. 
Scenario B: Exchange rates remain at end-2004 levels. 
Scenario C: The 20 year rate of depreciation at end-2004 persists. 
Scenario D: The rate of depreciation/appreciation experienced over 2001-04 continues after 2004. 
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Appendix 1 
Data Description and Sources 
 
Share is the proportion of currency holdings. GDPratio is the share of world GDP (evaluated at 
market exchange rates); Inflationdiff is the difference between a 5 year moving average of CPI 
inflation and industrialized country inflation; Exratevar is the trade weighted exchange rate 
volatility (monthly), measured as a 5 year moving average; Fxturnovertatio is turnover is daily 
turnover divided by total 5 center turnover; peg anchor variable is the proportion of pegged 
exchange rates linked to a particular currency. All variables are described in greater detail in the 
data appendix.  
 
Reserve currency holdings. Official reserve holdings of member central banks, at end of year. 
IMF internal database, in format corresponding to Table I.2 in the IMF Annual Report. 
Aggregate, industrial country and developing country. Current version, spliced version of 
Updated 2003 data obtained July 1, 2004 (for 1980 onward) to spreadsheet for 1965-2001. NA 
observations set to 0 except for the euro legacy currencies. In logistic transformations, 0 entries 
set to 0.000001 (0.0001%). Source: IMF Annual Reports, IMF databases. 
 
Ratio of GDP to total World GDP. Ratio of GDP in USD (converted at official exchange rates) to 
GDP of world aggregate. Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Euro area, world GDP 
data from IMF, World Economic Outlook.   
 
Inflation. Calculated as log difference of monthly CPI, averaged. Five year moving average is 
centered. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Euro area inflation for 1980-1998 is 
ECB data from Alquist and Chinn (2002).  
 
Exchange rate volatility. Calculated as the standard deviation of the log first difference of the 
SDR exchange rate. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
 
Forex Turnover. 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 from BIS Triannual Surveys. Billions of 
dollars of daily turnover, in April. Data from 1977-88 from G-30, NY Fed surveys, central bank 
surveys. Observations in-between survey years log-linearly interpolated. For 1973-1979, 
interpolation using 1977-79 relationship.   
 
Net international investment position is cumulated current account.  These net investment 
positions are normalized by World GDP (converted at official exchange rates). Source: 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002). 
 
Linked currency counts. For 1973-2000, tabulation based on data from Shambaugh 
(2004). Source: Personal communication from Jay Shambaugh.  The variable used in the 
regression is the proportion of currencies linked to a particular base currency (USD, 
DEM, etc.) as a proportion of all pegged rates tabulated. 
 
Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, Stock market total value traded to GDP ratio, Stock 
market turn over ratio, Private bond market capitalization to GDP ratio, Public bond market 
capitalization to GDP ratio.  Source: Beck et al. (2000).  





Appendix Table 1 
Additional Panel Regression Results 
 
Pre-euro (1973-98)             
Dependent variable: logit              
























Constant  -0.883  -0.451  -0.504  -0.186  -0.606  -0.170  -0.045 
  [0.174]  [0.133]  [0.124]  [.087]  [0.138]  [0.096]  [0.126] 
GDPratio (y)  5.869  2.789  2.233  0.744  2.766  0.680  2.181 
  [1.145]  [0.719]  [0.582]  [0.407]  [0.643]  [0.431]  [0.985] 
Inflationdiff (￿)  -1.456  -1.352  -1.613  -1.268  -1.563  -1.241  2.784 
  [1.002]  [0.945]  [0.938]  [0.613]  [0.975]  [0.616]  [1.760] 
Depreciation ( ￿s)               
               
Exratevar (￿)  0.230  -0.788  -0.412  -0.171  -0.483  -0.147  -0.662 
  [0.453]  [.548]  [0.466]  [0.296]  [0.483]  [0.293]  [0.466] 
Liquidity (liq)  0.327      0.006  -0.057  -0.005  -0.262 
  [0.265]      [0.039]  [.057]  [0.027]  [0.160] 
Peg base    -0.517           
    [0.457]           
Net Foreign Assets      -0.391         
      [1.031]         
Lag logit  0.867  0.884  0.879  0.962  0.851  0.963  0.955 
  [0.024]  [0.026]  [0.025]  [0.019]  [.029]  [.020]  [.031] 
N  182  182  182  161  162  155  63 
sample  73-98  73-98  73-98  76-98  75-98  76-98  90-98 
Adj R2  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.99  0.97   0.99   0.99  
Notes: Dependent variable log(sh/(1-sh)) Estimated using OLS.  All variables are in decimal form. GDP at 
market terms. Figures in bold face are significant at the 10% level.  
Liquidity is alternative measures of depth of financial market.  
Peg base is the proportion of pegged currencies associated with each reserve currency. 
Net Foreign Assets is the cumulated current accounts as a share of world GDP. 
Column [7] omits Japanese yen. 
  




















(GDP in PPP terms)
 
 



























































(GDP using market rates) 
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Figure 5: Currency share vs. Turnover      Figure 6: Currency share vs. proportion 





















Figure 1a: Logistic share vs. GDP (mkt. rates)              Figure 2a: Logistic share vs.  
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Figure 7: Reserves held by central banks as shares of total – major currencies 
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Figure 8 – Reserves held by central banks as shares of total – smaller currencies 























































































Figure 11: Case 2, Scenario B, Simulation of “No UK, Swe, Den”, and no further depreciation of the level 















Figure 12: Case 3, Scenario C. Simulation of “No UK”, and  depreciation at 2004 20 year trend rate 
 
  












Figure 13: Case 2, Scenario D, Simulation of “No UK, Swe., Den.” And continued depreciation of the 













Figure 14: Case 4, Scenario D, Simulation of “UK entry” and continued depreciation of the exchange rate 
at the 2001-04 rate. 